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Abstract
Biometric technologies have the potential to reduce the
effort involved in securing personal activities online, such
as purchasing goods and services. Verifying that a user
session on a website is attributable to a real human is one
candidate application, especially as the existing CAPTCHA
technology is burdensome and can frustrate users. Here we
examine the viability of biometrics as part of the consumer
experience in this space. We invited 87 participants to take
part in a lab study, using a realistic ticket-buying website
with a range of human verification mechanisms including
a face biometric technology. User perceptions and accep-
tance of the various security technologies were explored
through interviews and a range of questionnaires within the
study. The results show that some users wanted reassurance
that their personal image will be protected or discarded af-
ter verifying, whereas others felt that if they saw enough
people using face biometrics they would feel assured that it
was trustworthy. Face biometrics were seen by some par-
ticipants to be more suitable for high-security contexts, and
by others as providing extra personal data that had unac-
ceptable privacy implications.
1. Introduction
A CAPTCHA (“Completely Automated Public Turing
test to tell Computers and Humans Apart”) is a challenge-
response test where the user is asked to enter a sequence of
characters identified from a distorted image. CAPTCHAs
are intended to restrict use of online services to humans,
preventing automated programs (robots) from accessing –
and exploiting – those services. CAPTCHAs however de-
mand a high amount of effort to complete and Pogue [12]
calls for alternatives to be found.
We conducted a study that looked at the user perception
and acceptance of three mechanisms: (i) traditional text-
based CAPTCHAs, specifically Google’s reCAPTCHA1,
(ii) an alternative called Play Thru2 which requires the user
to drag and drop elements on the screen and (iii) NoBot3
which is a face biometric technology. While another pub-
lication [11] discusses all three mechanisms tested in the
study; in this paper, we focus on just the biometric one, ex-
ploring in depth user perceptions and challenges it might
face to gain user acceptance. NoBot is a face-recognition
technology that uses capabilities of the host computer de-
vice (i.e., a camera) to collect a sample sequence of face
images which are then processed centrally by the technol-
ogy provider. This processing determines if a live human is
using the device, as opposed to a – potentially automated
– replay of images that are not current (and as such not
“live”).
A realistic ticket-buying website was created for the pur-
poses of the study, where participants engaged with the hu-
man verification process as part of their purchasing activ-
ity. For NoBot in particular, we assessed the user experi-
ence of repeated use across either laptop or tablet. Exam-
ining use on a tablet is important as interactions and pur-
chases become increasingly mobile, posing significant us-
ability challenges such as entry of characters on a virtual
keyboard [13, 7].
We conducted a between-subjects study with 87 par-
ticipants across three conditions: 29 participants used re-
CAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot once, 27 used NoBot
three times on a laptop, and 31 used NoBot three times on
a tablet. Our study informs the understanding of deploying
biometrics as part of consumer services, and how prepared
people are to use biometrics in place of more familiar tech-
nologies. The NoBot face biometric is studied across dif-
ferent devices, but also compared to existing and competing
verification technologies. A realistic ticket-buying scenario
promotes discussion of the technologies as part of typical
1https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/old/intro
2http://areyouahuman.com/demo-playthru
3The developer did not commercialise this product and wishes not to
be named.
online activities, as opposed to being assessed in isolation.
Face biometrics, as a replacement technology, are as-
sessed for a variety of verification and authentication sit-
uations: participants not only used the technologies as part
of a ticket-buying website, but were also encouraged to dis-
cuss their impressions of each technology (where comments
were analysed), in addition to completing specialised ques-
tionnaires: this included an instantiated Technology Accep-
tance Model (TAM) survey, and a questionnaire identifying
different service contexts that the participant perceived were
appropriate applications for the verification solution(s) they
had used (including NoBot).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The
next section summarises the findings of related studies of
face biometrics, taking a critical look at the methodologies
used. The Methodology of the present study is then de-
scribed in Section 3, followed by a presentation of results in
Section 4 (including analysis of dialogue, and the TAM and
context questionnaires). Findings are then discussed in Sec-
tion 5 before concluding remarks and suggestions for future
work in the area in Section 6.
2. Related work
In this section, we describe related work evaluating the
user experience of biometric solutions.
Bhagavatula et al. [1] explored usability and participant
experience of both face- and fingerprint-based verification
for mobile devices, through a lab study and structured sur-
vey. Both mechanisms were compared side-by-side with
more traditional PINs within subjects. The study scenarios
were designed with physical settings in mind, such as using
the mechanisms while in motion or in a dark room, aim-
ing to assess user and technology performance. The results
show that participants preferred unlocking devices with a
fingerprint more than a PIN. Participants had more prob-
lems with face unlock and many abandoned using it.
Heckle et al. [9] asked participants to role-play pur-
chases on an online bookstore with role-played use of fin-
gerprint technologies. From the results the authors sug-
gested that application contexts with more apparent user
benefits were seen as more usable and acceptable
Trewin et al. [17] explore user demands – in terms
of time, effort, error and task disruption – of voice, face
and gesture, in a within-subjects study. Biometrics were
recorded as being faster than using passwords, although
none of the mechanisms were considered usable – this is
important, as although a mechanism can be regarded as bet-
ter than others, its “absolute” measure of usability may be
poor. The authors include a primary task which is a memory
exercise.
Khan et al. [10] explore the usability of implicit au-
thentication compared to explicit authentication solutions,
through a study in the lab and in the field. Participants
completed simulated tasks, where a field study engaged real
tasks and implications (such as annoyance). Implicit au-
thentication was simulated on participants’ own devices (al-
though they were unaware that the authentication applica-
tion was not operational), including simulated false rejects.
The authors collected both quantitative and qualitative data,
through task timing data and coded semi-structured inter-
views respectively. Security perceptions were captured (in-
cluding responses to fabricated “interruptions” produced by
the authentication technology), including implicit authenti-
cation as a replacement of existing approaches and willing-
ness to adopt the technology.
In the research so far, primary tasks have been limited to
assess user performance and did not entirely put participants
into realistic every-day scenario that would make them be-
have naturally. In the study presented here, we aim to make
the experience more realistic to ensure our findings are gen-
eralisable to the real world.
Where Heckle et al. [9] role-played the occurrence of er-
rors, we assess a real (face) verification technology, includ-
ing the complications of preparing for verification and re-
sponses to any problems such as false negatives, which con-
tribute to the perceived usability of the mechanism. Here we
have participants use a genuine third-party face biometric
solution in a lab-based setting. Participants completed tasks
typical of a mobile device, such as reading information from
a website, which were interrupted by the mechanism – here
an online ticket purchase site was used which weaves the
biometric directly into the task itself, interrupting the pri-
mary task. While Heckle et al. [9] used structured interview
questions prompting participants to consider their current
and potential online habits, here an online ticket purchasing
website and follow-up questions serve a similar purpose.
3. Methodology
The study was advertised as looking at the usability of
online shopping check-outs. To limit introduction of bi-
ases, CAPTCHAs, biometrics or security were not referred
to specifically at any time in the recruitment process or the
information sheet. The study sessions were conducted in
a usability laboratory with one participant at a time. In the
study, participants were tasked with purchasing three tickets
on a mock-up website and verification using a CAPTCHA
was part of the check-out. Figure 1 shows the verification
page of the website, here with PlayThru. There were 87 par-
ticipants in a between-subjects study with three conditions:
29 participants used reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot
once (condition abbreviated as M3all), 27 used NoBot three
times on a laptop (NBLap), and 31 used NoBot three times
on a tablet (NBTab). After the study, participants were
asked about their experience and filled in a series of ques-
tionnaires assessing their perceptions of and experiences
with the mechanisms.
Figure 1. A screenshot of the verification page from the study
showing PlayThru.
Any comments participants made and answers they gave
to interview questions were recorded and transcribed. Tran-
scriptions were assigned participant codes to protect the
identities of individuals in line with the research ethics ap-
proval process at our university.
3.1. NoBot’s verification stages
The NoBot verification mechanism differs from re-
CAPTCHA and PlayThru in that it has multiple stages.
When activated, the application uses the entire screen of the
device (as opposed to functioning only in the box seen in
Figure 1). NoBot then provides brief instructions for posi-
tioning one’s face for image capture. After instructions have
been acknowledged, the user positions their face according
to visual guides on the screen. The application then uses
the device camera to capture a series of images. There is
an interim stage where the application contacts the central
service to have the images processed, after which the user
is informed of the outcome and permitted to continue the
primary task or retry (should verification fail).
4. Results
The study transcripts were analysed using thematic anal-
ysis [2]. The interviews were conducted so as not to prime
and bias participants, who were free to make any com-
ments and share their spontaneous reactions with the exper-
imenter. This is a reason why some of the issues mentioned
below have low counts, and may potentially be under-
representative – here we capture user perceptions which
have implications for the deployment of biometrics, but
may also influence the uptake of those solutions.
4.1. Perception of face credentials
4.1.1 Use of personal images for human verification
Out of 87 participants, 24 expressed concern that someone
may see their picture once it is captured, or that some-
one may be able to identify them based on that picture.
PT294 explained:
“[NoBot] may be very dangerous in a way, it
makes me wary if all the data will be saved, what
sort of pictures have they actually taken, and will
they be able to figure out who I am.”
Eight participants believed any gain in security was not
worth the loss in privacy. 14 participants believed that other
people may be concerned about their personal biometric
data being used. 18 participants thought that taking their
picture was intrusive, PT15 questioned the need for images:
“Why did they want my photo? I feel a bit like
spied, why do they need my photo if I’m just buy-
ing tickets?”
Overall, 12 participants were concerned that how their
image is used would be dictated by NoBot and not them, or
that the background scene around them could not be con-
trolled by them (such as what else in the room is captured
and analysed). Participants also worried about when in the
process their picture can be taken and not just when they
are explicitly told that images are being captured (this might
have been influenced by the researchers setting camera per-
missions on the study machine ahead of the study). PM07
emphasised that they would be concerned about the security
of their home:
“if you have a very nice house, for example. Then
they know your address and where you live, then
they know what the inside of your house looks
like, through the windows. If you really think
about this, it’s a bit not dangerous but risky.”
4.1.2 Use of personal image as service credential data
Seven participants believed that their own face (or a per-
son’s face generally) was very personal, PT02 told us:
“at the same time it feels like something quite in-
timate as well, it is your face, it feels quite differ-
ent to say Google scans your emails for keywords
where that’s just text, whereas [your face] is you.”
However, five participants appeared neutral about a pro-
cess that uses face images to verify a person. For a smaller
number of participants, the personal nature of a person’s
face was seen as making it more secure. For six partici-
pants, the uniqueness of a face as an identifier was a hin-
drance, preventing them from delegating use of an online
service to someone else, PL27 explained:
“if it’s for me only, it’s fine. If I was sharing my
computer with other people, it’s not such a great
thing, it stops them from doing stuff for me.”
4The first letter of the participant number indicates which condition
they were in: “M”–M3all “L”–NBLap and “T”–NBTab.
Three participants wondered if their camera images
would be analysed by the service provider or verification
technology to create targeted advertising, PL13 expressed
their concern:
“they’re storing the details to the face that you
put in and you start getting spam, like things that
are relevant to you because of your skin colour,
make-up relevant to that.”
4.2. Expectations for use of personal image data
Of 87 participants, 68 (78%) requested that their images
be deleted after the study. The highest number of deletion
requests was in the mixed condition when participants tried
all three mechanisms (90%) and the lowest in NBTab when
NoBot was used on the tablet (71%).
Ten participants believed that use of their image should
be short-lived and dictated by the need of the service
provider to use their image to provide them the service,
PT09 explained:
“I just don’t like my pictures being stored on the
computer, and how long do they have that infor-
mation for? When will it be discarded. . . when
I’ve finished purchasing the ticket?”
Similarly, ten participants wanted there to be an explicit
assurance that images would be deleted after they have been
used to provide the service. Nine participants asserted that
persistent storage of their personal images would not be ap-
propriate. For seven participants, seeing other people using
the technology would be assurance for them that they can
also use the technology. Eight participants wanted an ex-
plicit assurance of what it was that NoBot was able to do
with their image or what they intended to do with it, and
two participants wanted NoBot to demonstrate legitimacy
using certificates. PT12 stated:
“it’s implied that what I see is what they see, but
it’s not quite transparent.”
4.3. Perception of the NoBot implementation
A total of 20 participants believed that the purpose of
NoBot was to verify that they were a human and not a robot.
Five participants assumed that NoBot verified a person’s
identity or that the person was the legitimate account holder
for ticket payment – one participant assumed that facial im-
ages could be used in cases of fraud after the fact. Two
participants misunderstood what aspect of their face the
technology was capturing, where one believed NoBot cap-
tured only eye movement. 18 participants thought NoBot
was intended to identify an individual, and 18 thought it
was specifically used to support the identification process
related to live entertainment events. PT18 explained:
”I think it might be on my ticket, that would make
sense, there’d be a picture on my ticket, it’s me,
it’ll probably waste less time.”
Seven participants wanted an explanation of the whole
process before it started (in some cases to help them un-
derstand why verification had failed, should the process go
wrong), PT10 stated:
“I guess it’s a bit odd if you don’t know why
they’re doing it. . . ‘Why do they need a picture
of me?’ ”
Three participants thought it was important for there to
be an explanation of the motivation behind the product and
why it was doing what it was doing. Three participants
wanted instructions more specific to the context of use.
Three participants thought the existing instructions should
be clearer, whereas one person felt that having seen the in-
structions once they did not need to see them again during
subsequent use of the product. PT12 suggested:
“what would be helpful would be if they said:
‘Hold the tablet closer to your face.’ ”
Nine participants preferred not see their face during im-
age capture, and be guided by the application to the ap-
propriate position in front of the device’s camera, as this
sidestepped any sense of self-consciousness. However,
seven participants assumed that what was being captured
by the application was the same as what they saw on the de-
vice screen (which was a simplified representation of their
outline and not the full-colour photo image).
4.4. Technology Acceptance Model
To gauge participants’ acceptance of the three mecha-
nisms, they were asked to complete an instantiated Tech-
nology Acceptance Model (TAM) questionnaire [4]. The
instantiation took several rounds of iteration between the
members of our research team. To illustrate an example of
a change that was made: “productivity” was replaced with
“security”.
Table 1 presents the statements used and average scores
of in how far participants agreed with them on a 1-7 Lik-
ert scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree). An
ANOVA and then post-hoc tests were conducted on the
mean scores for each mechanism and any significant differ-
ences are highlighted. Where table cells are shaded there
was a statistically significant difference between mecha-
nisms, with the darker cell being the lower value in each
pair. For conditions NBLap and NBTab, there were no sta-
tistically significant differences between the scores that par-
ticipants gave. In the comparison M3all, the differences in
average scores between reCAPTCHA and PlayThru were
small and not statistically significant. NoBot received the
Statement reCAP PlayThru NoBot
1. Using this product increases the security of my online activities. 5.3 5 4.48
2. Using this product gives my greater protection of my online activities. 5 5 4
3. This product enables me to accomplish tasks more quickly. 3 3.6 3.3
4. This product supports critical aspects. 4.2 4.2 3.6
5. This product increases my productivity. 3.2 3.4 2.8
6. This product encourages me to conduct more activities online. 3.4 3.6 2.5
7. This product allows me to finish tasks quicker and more securely. 3.7 4.4 3.2
8. This product enhances my effectiveness in protecting my online activities. 4.8 4.3 3.8
9. This product makes it more secure to do my activities online. 5.1 4.8 3.8
10. Overall, I find this product useful for my online activities. 4.9 4.5 3.3
Table 1. Statements for an instantiated Technology Acceptance Model and an average score of in how far participants agreed with them on
a 1-7 Likert scale.
lowest ratings of all mechanisms for all statements that were
statistically significant. Participants rated NoBot as offer-
ing them not as great protection of their online activities,
less encouraging them to conduct more activities online and
overall, being less useful for their online activities.
The lower scores for protection and security are interest-
ing here since in the interviews ten participants considered
NoBot to be more secure than other mechanisms. An expla-
nation for this apparent discrepancy could be that our partic-
ipants perceived security more broadly, considering not just
the protection of the website from bots but also the security
of their own user account and associated data. 17 partic-
ipants in the study imagined myriad attacks that could be
performed on NoBot and 32 worried about the implications
of a compromise of the NoBot image database.
4.5. Different service contexts
After the ticket purchases, participants were asked to in-
dicate in what contexts they would be willing to use the
mechanism(s) they tried. The contexts such as contribut-
ing to an online forum or buying a ticket were taken from
real-life deployments of CAPTCHAs.
Table 2 shows the different contexts and the percentages
of participants willing to use the three mechanisms to ver-
ify to complete these activities. There was no statistically
significant difference between the NBLap and NBTab con-
ditions, so they are combined in the first column. Overall,
participants indicated greatest willingness to use the mech-
anisms for ticket purchasing which is not surprising given
this was the scenario used in our study.
Participants were least willing to verify when contribut-
ing to a forum using PlayThru and NoBot. For NoBot, six
participants stressed that the nature of forums is that the
contributors want to be anonymous. This reveals a common
perception that the service provider or other users would see
the pictures taken by NoBot which was, to our knowledge,
not the intention or expectation of its developers.
We saw that frequency of use mattered to participants as
PM03 stated:
“Topping up my Oyster5 is a small task so why do
you have to get my picture? Because I top up like
every month or every week so I don’t want to do
it, it gets in the way.”
Similarly PM05 stated frequency of use and value of the
transaction mattered in other contexts,
“For Oyster, I felt it’s such a basic thing where
you’re not going to be spending that much money,
it doesn’t make that much sense. For bidding on
eBay, it would slow everything down, it wouldn’t
work. I spend a lot of time on eBay so that just
wouldn’t be a thing.”
Outside of the structured preference elicitation exercise
around service contexts, throughout the study sessions par-
ticipants shared thoughts about suitable or unsuitable situ-
ations for using NoBot. 21 participants stressed that they
would use NoBot in situations where they would need to
prove their identity, with eight mentioning travel-related
transactions such as purchasing plane tickets. Nine par-
ticipants also thought NoBot would be good to prove their
identity for money-related activities with two participants
suggesting it for banking and four for high-value transac-
tions. In line with this, some participants also considered
NoBot to be too heavy-handed for trivial ticket-buying (6)
and low-value transactions (1). However, some participants
expressed contrasting views due to their lack of trust to-
wards NoBot, with one participant stressing they would not
use it for anything involving money and another wanting to
use it only for low-value transactions.
Within the suggested service contexts participants stated
they would not use NoBot for time-critical purchases where
they had to buy the tickets or goods fast (4 mentions) or
if they needed to delegate a purchase (2), since they be-
lieved the item or ticket was then tied to their identity. Addi-
tionally, three participants emphasised they would not wish
to be photographed to verify if they were in a private set-
ting (e.g., in their bedroom) or if they were buying sensitive
items (2).
5An Oyster card is a payment card for London’s public transport.
Context NBL+T reCmix PTmix NBmix
Contributing to an online forum 16 59 15 24
Buying tickets online 76 93 79 55
Browsing for plane tickets 50 76 55 45
Checking in for flights online 62 86 54 52
Topping up your Oyster online 52 66 69 31
Bidding on items on eBay 38 66 69 31
Logging in to Facebook from a different computer 47 66 66 34
Table 2. Percentages of participants willing to use reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot in different contexts.
5. Discussion
5.1. Biometrics – usable by default?
Researchers assumed that biometric solutions would be
usable by default [6] as users do not need to memorise a
password or remember to carry a token. However, a study
by Sasse et al. [15] showed that usability is still a problem
if a biometric solution is not integrated well, meaning if it is
just added on and the underlying structure is not changed. In
the organisation they studied, some participants used a bio-
metric fingerprint reader to log in to their computer. Reg-
ular passwords changes were mandated by policy, and the
participants who used a biometric fingerprint for logging in
remained subject to these password changes. When asked
to change their password, they had to find where they had
written their previous password (usually on a post-it kept in
a drawer), enter it, come up with a new password that would
comply with the policy, enter it, note it down and re-enrol
their fingerprint against that new password.
The study on NoBot presented here showed that the user
interface confused participants, and that the technology did
not explain itself, its purpose, or its process enough to avoid
creating – rather than minimising – confusion. Participants
became more accepting of the technology once provided
with an explanation of what the technology was doing and
why. Providing an explanation is important as demonstrated
by Egelman et al. [5], who showed that users are more ac-
cepting of security-related delays if they are provided with
a reason for why it is happening. Similarly, if face biomet-
rics have a dedicated sampling stage, this in turn requires
user effort and involvement in the capture process, and so
guidance is needed to support the user. Different physical
conditions may influence the reliability of the technology
(as seen elsewhere [1]), and so users may need guidance to
limit capture of poor-quality images.
5.2. Adoption by others as determinant of accept-
ability
A proportion of participants spoke about what “others”
would think, or otherwise determined that they would use
face biometrics (with the associated data retention and pro-
tection requirements) once a critical mass of users was
reached. Heckle et al. [9] found participants were fatalis-
tic about fingerprints, and keen to follow what others do.
Sharing of biometric data with commercial entities has been
noted as a concern for users elsewhere [8], although in this
study there was a perception amongst some participants that
if a company became successful, this very same success
would compel them to treat personal image data appropri-
ately with respect to customer privacy.
Biometrics would not necessarily be deployed in a
“greenfield” environment where no verification or authen-
tication technology already exists, and so they may com-
pete not just with established technologies but also with
the pervading perceptions of those technologies. Wash [18]
for instance showed that home computer users can develop
their own rationalisations for how technologies and related
security threats affect them. Several participants in our
study emphasised that it was hard to compare NoBot and
PlayThru to reCAPTCHAs since they were so familiar with
text-based CAPTCHAs.
Participant perceptions of security were another interest-
ing finding. On the one hand, some participants thought
NoBot was more secure than reCAPTCHA and PlayThru;
while on the other hand, they rated it as giving them less
security and protection. One explanation for it could be that
participants distinguished between the security for the ser-
vice provider as opposed to the security of their data. An-
other explanation might be that different participants had
different contexts of application in mind where they might
have thought for example that different situations required
different levels of security.
It is important to note that NoBot is an unusual applica-
tion of biometric capabilities since the user does not have
to enrol to use it. This is an advantage in one way because
it requires less effort; however, the enrolment can normally
be used to explain the technology to the user [14], tell them
how to present their biometric feature [16] and overcome
a first hurdle which can increase user acceptance [3] and
facilitate future interactions with the technology.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented the results of a viability study
of NoBot, a biometric solution using face recognition, as a
CAPTCHA replacement, compared with the established re-
CAPTCHA and a game alternative – PlayThru. We found
that participants perceived NoBot to be more suitable to
use in some service contexts more than others, and that
their sense of trust towards the company mattered. Our
study stresses the importance of user testing of proposed
technologies, looking at both their perceived usability and
user acceptance, exploring what sense users make of the
mechanisms for themselves and what explanations might be
needed.
For future work, we will assess the face biometric tech-
nology across a wider range of services, beyond the ticket-
buying context. We will also study use of the technology
in the wild, not just outside the lab environment but also on
participants’ personal computers and mobile devices. These
observations will be instrumented to capture expected use,
but also user reactions when encountering difficulties.
6.1. Recommendations
In our study, we assessed a range of existing and proto-
type commercial products. Not every product was perceived
as appropriate or a natural fit in every context. When bio-
metric technologies are being developed or assessed for via-
bility, it is important to examine user understanding of these
technologies and how they interact with them, as specialised
instructions may be necessary. Any instructions should be
crafted so as not to overload the user, but nonetheless in
the absence of supporting information individuals may for-
mulate their own rationalisations as to how the technology
works (for instance remaining still only at the start of image
capture or turning their head during capture).
Further, it is crucial to assess a technology within the
context of the task(s) that they would support (here ticket
buying). On needs to determine where users perceive the
technology as being most appropriate to use – this can not
only identify where a biometric technology is seen as a nat-
ural fit for a task, but also expose any misconceptions about
what the technology would do in that given context.
It is important to examine user perceptions not just of the
technology being assessed, but also relative to the technol-
ogy it may supplant – biometric solutions can potentially re-
place “what you have” and “what you know” authentication
technologies that are already in use, and existing user un-
derstanding of those technologies may be applied to a new
technology or related to it in some way.
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